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Abstract—We present and evaluate Deep Private-Feature Extractor (DPFE), a deep model which is trained and evaluated based on
information theoretic constraints. Using the selective exchange of information between a user’s device and a service provider, DPFE
enables the user to prevent certain sensitive information from being shared with a service provider, while allowing them to extract
approved information using their model. We introduce and utilize the log-rank privacy, a novel measure to assess the effectiveness of
DPFE in removing sensitive information and compare different models based on their accuracy-privacy tradeoff. We then implement
and evaluate the performance of DPFE on smartphones to understand its complexity, resource demands, and efficiency tradeoffs.
Our results on benchmark image datasets demonstrate that under moderate resource utilization, DPFE can achieve high accuracy for
primary tasks while preserving the privacy of sensitive information.
Index Terms—Feature Extraction, Privacy, Information Theory, Deep Learning.
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1 INTRODUCTION
THE increasing collection of personal data generatedby, or inferred from, our browsing habits, wearable
devices, and smartphones, alongside the emergence of the
data from the Internet of Things (IoT) devices are fueling
many new classes of applications and services. These in-
clude healthcare and wellbeing apps, financial management
services, personalized content recommendations, and social
networking tools. Many of these systems and apps rely on
data sensing and collection at the user side, and uploading
the data to the cloud for consequent analysis.
While many of the data-driven services and apps are
potentially beneficial, the underlying unvetted and opaque
data collection and aggregation protocols can cause exces-
sive resource utilization (i.e., bandwidth and energy) [1],
and more importantly data security threats and privacy
risks [2]. Collection and processing of private informa-
tion on the cloud introduces a number of challenges and
tradeoffs, especially when scalability of data collection and
uploading practice are taken into consideration. The data
is often fed into machine learning models for extracting
insights and features of commercial interest, where the in-
formation is exposed to data brokers and service providers.
While certain features of the data can be of interest for
specific applications (e.g., location-based services, or mobile
health applications), the presence of additional information
in the data can lead to unintended subsequent privacy
leakages [3], [4]. Current solutions to this problem, such
as cryptography [5], [6], complete data isolation and local
processing [7] are not efficient for big data and techniques
relying on deep learning [8]. In today’s data-driven ecosys-
tem, these privacy challenges are an inherent side effect of
many big data and machine learning applications.
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Fig. 1: The proposed hybrid framework for user-cloud col-
laboration.
In this paper, we focus on providing privacy at the first
step of this ecosystem: the exchange of acquired user data
between the end user and a service provider. We propose a
novel solution based on a compromise between scalability
and privacy. The proposed framework is based on the idea
that when preparing data for subsequent analysis by service
provider, the end user does not need to hide all the infor-
mation by means of cryptographic methods, which can be
resource-hungry or overly complex for the end-user device.
Instead, it might suffice to remove the sensitive parts of the
information (e.g., identity features in a face image), while
at the same time preserving the necessary information for
further analysis. This is also the case in many surveillance
applications where a central node is required to process user
data that may be sensitive in some aspects.
The proposed hybrid framework in which the user and
cloud collaborate to analyze the raw user data in a private
and efficient manner is depicted in figure 1. Our work relies
on the assumption that the service provider releases a pub-
licly verifiable feature extractor module based on an initial
training set. The user then performs a minimalistic analysis
and extracts a private-feature from the data and sends it to
the service provider (i.e., the cloud) for subsequent analysis.
The private-feature is then analyzed in the cloud and the
result yields back to the user. The fundamental challenge in
using this framework is the design of the feature extractor
module that removes sensitive information properly, and
on the other hand does not impact scalability by imposing
heavy computational requirements on the user’s device.
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Fig. 2: Privacy concerns may exist when: (i) data holder
shares a public dataset: anonymity of individuals are threat-
ened; (ii) data holders participate in a model training proce-
dure with their private data; (iii) a model provider shares a
publicly-learned model: the privacy of the individuals’ data
used for training is at risk; (iv) an end user shares his/her
data with the service provider: private information can
be revealed to the service provider; (v) a service provider
shares query answers with the end user: an attacker can
infer the model itself by launching repeated queries.
In the rest of this paper, we first discuss the privacy
issues in different aspects of machine learning and consider
the problem of “user data privacy in interaction with cloud
services” as the main purpose of this paper. To design the
feature extractor module, we express our privacy preserva-
tion concerns in an optimization problem based on mutual
information and relax it to be addressable by deep learning.
We then present the Deep Private-Feature Extractor (DPFE),
a tool for solving the aforementioned relaxed problem. We
then propose a new privacy measure, the log-rank privacy,
to verify the proposed feature extractor, measure its privacy,
and evaluate the efficiency of the model in removing sen-
sitive information. The log-rank privacy can be interpreted
from different perspectives, including entropy, k-anonymity
and classification error. We evaluate this framework under
the facial attribute prediction problem by using face images.
In this context, we remove the face identity information
while keeping facial attribute information, and analyze the
privacy-accuracy performance tradeoff. Finally, we imple-
ment different private-feature extractors on mobile phone
to compare the performance of different solutions and ad-
dressing the scalability concern.
The main contributions of this paper are: (i) Proposing
a hybrid user-cloud framework for the user data privacy
preservation problem which utilizes a private-feature ex-
tractor as its core component; (ii) Designing the private-
feature extractor based on information theoretic concepts
leading to an optimization problem (Section 3); (iii) Propos-
ing a deep neural network architecture to solve the opti-
mization problem (Section 4); (iv) Proposing a measure to
evaluate privacy and verify the feature extractor module
(Section 5).1
2 PRIVACY IN MACHINE LEARNING
Machine learning methods need to analyze sensitive data
in many usecases to perform their desired tasks which
may violate users’ privacy. This fundamental dichotomy has
been appearing in different aspects of machine learning, as
listed in Figure 2. These concerns can be classified as public
dataset privacy, training phase privacy, training data privacy,
model privacy and user data privacy which are discussed in
the rest of this section.
1. All the code and models for the paper are available on https://
github.com/aliosia/DPFE
2.1 Public Dataset Privacy
Training data is the crucial component of each learning
system. Collecting and sharing rich datasets for data mining
tasks can be highly beneficial to the learning community,
although it might come with privacy concerns that make it
a double-edged sword. Publishing a dataset that satisfies
both parties by preserving the users’ privacy and other
useful information for data mining tasks, is a challenging
problem and has long line of work. Agrawal and Srikant [9]
were some of the first to address the privacy concern in
data mining for sharing a generic dataset for learning tasks,
in addition to considering users’ privacy. They utilized a
randomization technique, in which by adding noise to data
they guaranteed its privacy. The resulting distribution of
noisy data might have been different from the original
distribution. To reconstruct the original distribution, a re-
covery method was introduced in the paper and extended
by Agrawal et al. in [10]. By utilizing this method, it is
possible to train a learning model on reconstructed data
with the same distribution as the original data. Many works
have followed this trend and extended this idea, however,
this approach faces two important obstacles: curse of dimen-
sionality and non-robustness to attacks [11], which make it
inefficient for high dimensional data with side informations.
k-anonymity is another popular option for addressing the
problem of anonymous dataset publishing, first introduced
by Sweeney [12]. Publishing a health database that contains
patient sensitive information is one of the favored instance
of k-anonymity usages. Assuming all data points have
identity documents (IDs) that should be kept private, k-
anonymity deals with transforming a dataset in a way that,
having an individual data features, one cannot infer its ID
among at least k identities. Many researches are presented to
make a database k-anonymous [13], [14], [15], [16] and most
of them are based on the generalization (e.g. removing the
last digit of the patient zip code) or suppression of features
(e.g. removing the name). Nevertheless, this approach deals
with some important challenges when facing attacks [11],
although [17], [18] and [19] tried to overcome these chal-
lenges. Furthermore, they are only well-suited for structured
databases with high level features (e.g. relational databases)
which makes them hard to deploy for other type of data
(e.g. image and video). Newton et al. [20] published a k-
anonymous image dataset by proposing the k-same algo-
rithm. While they build the desired dataset by constructing
average images among k identities, their employed models
are not reliable today.
2.2 Training Phase Privacy
A common problem of centralized learning is the collection
of training data, especially when dealing with individual’s
sensitive data (e.g. health information). People are usually
reluctant in sharing data that includes their habits, interests,
and geographical positions. The upcoming solution to this
problem is federated learning, where data holders keep their
data private, while they communicate with a central node in
order to train a learning model in a cooperative manner.
[21] tried to address this problem by using distributed
stochastic gradient descent (SGD), where each party loads
the latest parameters, update them using SGD and upload
3the new selected parameters to the central node that holds
the global model. While in that case direct leakage of private
data can be prevented, the uploaded gradients might still
include sensitive information from the training data. Thus,
a differentially private algorithm is required for sharing the
gradients which is proposed in that work. This approach
still has some major problems e.g. loose privacy bound
addressed by [22] and potential threats by generative adver-
sarial networks addressed by [23]. An alternative solution
to this problem could be the use of cryptographic tech-
niques like secure multi-party computation, recently used
by [24]. However, these techniques are still not applicable
on complex neural networks, due to their low efficiency and
accuracy.
2.3 Training-Data Privacy
The growing popularity of public learning models raises
the concern of privacy of the individuals involved in the
training dataset. Differentially private algorithms brought
us a rigorous answer to this problem, by providing a method
to answer queries from a statistical database, without dis-
closing individuals’ information, as formalized by [25]. An
algorithm is called differentially private if the conditional
likelihood ratio of presence and absence of an individual,
given the transformed statistic, is close to one. Adding noise
to the original statistic is one popular method leading to
differential privacy. We can consider a learning model as
a complex statistic of its training data which should not
reveal information about the individuals. Answering com-
plex queries by combining simple queries is the way various
learning models, such as Principal Component Analysis and
k-means, can be made differentially private (see the surveys
by [26] and [27]). Recently differentially private deep models
were proposed by [28]. The authors in [22] introduced
a privacy preservation framework by utilizing differential
privacy which is not specific to the learning model and
possesses a state of the art privacy-accuracy tradeoff.
2.4 Model Privacy
Model privacy is the concern of the service provider and
deals with keeping the learning model private, while return-
ing the inference results to the user. Throughout these years,
less attention has been paid to the model privacy, although
some works such as [29] studied this problem. In general, an
adversary can infer the model parameters by making many
queries to the learning model and aggregate the answers.
[29] considered this approach for some basic models, e.g.
logistic regression, multilayer perceptron and decision tree.
2.5 User Data Privacy
The increasing usage of cloud-based systems has triggered
a situation where preserving privacy is a challenging but
important task. That is, when the user data and the pre-
trained learning model is not accessible from the same place,
inevitably user data must be sent to the service provider
for further analysis. Usually, cryptographic schemes are
prevalent in these situations, where two parties do not
trust each other. Focusing on the deep models offered by
a cloud service, [30] introduced this problem and proposed
a homomorphic encryption method to execute the inference
directly on the encrypted data. Even though this work is
an interesting approach to the problem, a number of short-
comings makes it impractical. In fact, approximating a deep
neural network with a low degree polynomial function may
not be feasible without sacrificing accuracy. Furthermore,
the complexity of the encryption is relatively high which
makes it inefficient for the real-world online applications.
An alternative to homomorphic encryption was suggested
by [31]. They used garbled circuit protocol and address
some of the discussed challenges, however they were lim-
ited to employing simple neural networks and had very
high computational cost.
In summary, using cryptographic techniques on complex
deep neural networks is not feasible yet, while the problem
of user data privacy is getting more and more important
everyday in the cloud computing era. In this paper we are
targeting this challenge and try to address it with a machine
learning solution, based on a specific kind of feature extrac-
tion model, formulated in the next section.
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we address the user data privacy challenge in
a different manner from encryption-based methods. The key
intuition is that for many applications we can remove all of
the user’s sensitive (unauthorized) information while retain-
ing the ability to infer the primary (authorized) information.
This is as opposed to encryption-based solutions that try
to encode all the information such that only authorized
users can access it. For instance, we may want to focus
on hiding individuals’ identities in a video surveillance
system, but still allow to count the number of participants.
In this scenario, a trivial solution is to censor people’s
faces in the frames, however this solution fails when the
purpose is to measure the facial attributes such as emotion
or gender. Henceforth, we address this problem as a privacy
preservation problem and use the terms primary and sensitive
information as the information needed to be preserved
and removed, respectively. Assuming the service provider
knows the primary and sensitive random variables, we
abstract this concept as an optimization problem by utiliz-
ing mutual information (see Appendix A for information
theoretic preliminaries).
Let x be the input, z the primary, and y the sensitive
variables. We would like to extract a feature f, by applying
a function g on x, which is informative about the primary
variable and non-informative about the sensitive variable.
We refer to the extracted feature as private-feature. More
specifically, the desired private-feature is obtained through
maximizing mutual information between the feature and
primary variable I(f; z), while minimizing mutual informa-
tion between the feature and sensitive variable I(f; y), as
follows:
max
f
I(f; z)− βI(f; y)
s.t. f = g(x)
where I(A;B) represents the mutual information be-
tween two random variables A and B.
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Fig. 3: Private-feature extraction probabilistic graphical
model.
Even though at the first glance it seems that the opti-
mal solution of this problem is to set f equal to the best
estimation of z, this is not applicable in many real world
applications because: (a) the optimal model which perfectly
predicts z can be too complicated, and hence using such a
feature extractor in the client-side is impossible; and (b) the
service provider may not share the whole model with the
client for some reasons such as copyright issues. Assuming
we can accurately estimate f by using a member of family
of functions G = {g(x; θ)|θ ∈ Θ}, then the optimization
problem becomes:
max
θ
I(f; z)− βI(f; y)
s.t. f = g(x; θ)
(1)
where, f is a deterministic function of the input variable,
parameterized by θ. The graphical model of this problem is
shown in Figure 3.
Optimizing mutual information has been widely used in
many information theoretic approaches of machine learning
problems. The authors in [32] formulated the Infomax and
tried to address the problem of unsupervised determinis-
tic invertible feature extraction by maximizing the mutual
information between the input and feature. [33] relaxed
the limiting invertibility constraint and used a variational
approach which leads to the IM algorithm for maximiz-
ing the mutual information. Recently, [34] used a similar
method to maximize the mutual information in generative
adversarial networks. These works can be considered as
the fundamental works in the problem of unsupervised
feature extraction from information theoretic viewpoint,
however, since we are utilizing a supervised approach,
those methods cannot be applied to our case. Among works
considering supervised feature extraction, The information
bottleneck introduced in [35] is the most relevant work. In
general, Information bottleneck provides an information
theoretic framework for analyzing the supervised feature
extraction procedure. Although their optimization prob-
lem almost looks similar to ours, there is a fundamental
difference between the two approaches. More specifically,
they use I(f; x) instead of I(f; y), meaning that irrelevant
information to z should be removed by minimizing I(f; x)
in the process of feature extraction. Therefore, they can not
directly consider the privacy constraints about y. Moreover,
their optimization problem is solved through an analytical
approach that assumes that the joint probability distribution
p(x, z), is known. However, in practice this distribution
is often unavailable. Although their analytical method is
impractical, nevertheless, their framework provides a pow-
erful tool for analysis of the supervised feature extraction
methods.
Similar to the information bottleneck optimization
problem, the private-feature extraction problem
(Equation 1) is non-convex and can not be solved through
the known convex optimization algorithms. To overcome
this challenge, it is common to bound the optimization
problem, and then by using the iterative methods similar to
[33] and [36], obtain the desired results. To this end, we first
obtain the lower and upper bounds for I(f; z) and I(f; y)
respectively, and then try to maximize the lower bound
of Equation 1. Henceforth, we assume y to be a discrete
sensitive variable in order to address the classification
privacy problem.
Lower bound for I(f; z). We derive a variational lower
bound for mutual information by first expressing Lemma 1
and then proving Theorem 2.
Lemma 1. For any arbitrary conditional distribution q(z|f),
we have:
I(f; z) ≥ Ef,z log q(z|f)
p(z)
(2)
Proof See Appendix B.1.
Theorem 2. The lower bound L for I(f; z) is given by:
L = H(z) + max
φ
Ef,z log q(z|f ;φ) (3)
Proof For all members of a parametric family of
distributions {q(z|f ;φ)|φ ∈ Φ}, the right hand side
of Equation 2 can be considered as the lower bound
for mutual information. The equality happens when
q(z|f) is equal to p(z|f). Therefore, if we consider a
rich family of distributions for q in which a member
can approximate p(z|f) well enough, we can obtain
a tight enough lower bound for mutual information
by maximizing the right hand side of Equation 2 with
respect to φ. By utilizing the definition of Entropy, we
obtain L as the desired lower bound.
Upper bound for I(f; y). A two-step procedure can be
used to find an upper bound for the mutual information.
First, we use the Lemma 3 and Jensen inequality to prove
Theorem 4, and obtain U1 as the primitive upper bound for
I(f; y). Then we use kernel density estimation (KDE) (see
[37]) and use Lemma 5 and 6 to obtain U2 as the desired
upper bound for I(f; y) through Theorem 7.
Lemma 3. Assume y is a discrete random variable with
{ya|1 ≤ a ≤ cy} as its range, then:
I(f; y) =
∑
a
p(ya)
∫
p(f |ya) log p(f |ya)∑
b p(yb)p(f |yb)
df
Proof By substituting p(f,y)p(f)p(y) with
p(f |y)
p(f) and then p(f)
with
∑
b p(yb)p(f |yb) in the main formula of I(f; y), we
obtain the desired relation.
5By utilizing Jensen inequality2 and manipulating
Lemma 3, we can compute U1 as a primitive upper bound
for mutual information, as follows.
Theorem 4. The upper bound U1 for I(f; y) is given by:
U1 =
∑
a
∑
b:b6=a
p(ya) p(yb) Dkl
[
p(f |ya)‖p(f |yb)
]
(4)
Proof See Appendix B.2.
Since computing U1 by Equation 4 is not tractable, we
use an approximation technique to obtain the upper bound.
By employing the kernel density estimation, we can effi-
ciently estimate p(f) [38]. We then utilize the Silverman’s
rule of thumb [39] and use a Gaussian kernel with the
desired diagonal covariance matrix. Next, by normalizing
each dimension of the feature space to have zero mean and
unit variance, we acquire a symmetric Gaussian kernel with
fixed covariance matrix, σI , where σ is a constant depending
on the dimensionality of the feature space and the size of
the training data. This kind of normalization is a common
process in machine learning [40] and is impartial of relations
among different dimensions including independency and
correlation. Finally, conditioning on y, for each ya we can
think of p(f |ya) as a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) (see
[37]) and use the following lemmas from [41] to obtain a
reliable upper bound.
Lemma 5. [41] For two multidimensional Gaussian distri-
butions, p and q, with µp and µq as their expected values
and the same covariance matrix σI , we have:
Dkl(p‖q) = 1
2σ
‖µp − µq‖22
Lemma 6. [41] For two given GMMs p =
∑
a piapa and
q =
∑
b ωbqb, we have:
Dkl(p‖q) ≤
∑
a,b
pia ωb Dkl(pa‖qb)
where for each a and b, pa and qb are Gaussian distribu-
tions forming the mixtures.
We can use Theorem 4, Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 to derive
the desired upper bound for I(f; y).
Theorem 7. Having large training data, the upper bound U2
for I(f; y) is given by:
U2 = 1
σN2
∑
(i,j):
yi 6=yj
‖fi − fj‖22 (5)
where fi is the extracted feature from data xi and its
corresponding label yi. The sum is over pairs of points
with different y labels.
Proof See Appendix B.3.
In other words, U2 is an upper bound that is propor-
tional to the average Euclidean distance between each pairs
of feature vectors having different y labels. This value is
practically hard to estimate, especially when we use SGD,
2. see Appendix A
and have large number of classes. Therefore, as stated in
Theorem 8 and Corollary 9, we use an equivalent relation
for U2 which is easier to optimize.
Theorem 8. Constraining the variance of each dimension of
feature space to be 1, we have:
U2 = 1
σN2
∑
(i,j):
yi=yj
(c− ‖fi − fj‖22) (6)
where c is a constant function of feature space dimension
and number of training data.
Proof See Appendix B.4.
Corollary 9. We can optimize the right hand side of Equa-
tion 6 instead of Equation 5 fo obtain U2.
Considering Corollary 9 together with Theorem 8, we
realize that for a random pair of feature points, we should
decrease their distance if the y labels are different, and
increase their distance if they are the same. This is very
similar to the Contrastive loss idea presented in [42] which is
a popular loss function for Siamese architecture [43]. Siamese
networks are used for metric learning purposes and tends
to form a feature space in which similar points are gathered
near each other. This is the opposite of what we aim to
achieve: increase the distance of similar points and decrease
the distance of dissimilar points.
By utilizing the suggested lower and upper bounds, we
can substitute the original private-feature extraction prob-
lem (Equation 1) with the following relaxed problem.
min
θ,φ
∑
fi,zi
− log q(zi|fi;φ)
+
β
2σN2
[ ∑
(i,j):
yi 6=yj
‖fi − fj‖22 +
∑
(i,j):
yi=yj
(c− ‖fi − fj‖22)
]
s.t. fi = g(xi; θ)
(7)
Considering the above equation, we should optimize an
objective function that consists of two loss functions: the loss
of the primary variable preservation modeled by a classi-
fication loss (first term), and the loss of sensitive variable
elimination modeled by a contrastive loss (second term).
Thus, the general training framework of the private-feature
extractor contains three main modules: feature extractor,
primary variable predictor and sensitive variable remover,
as shown in Figure 4. Note that according to the second
term of Equation 7, the loss function of removing sensitive
variable is defined on the pairs of samples, and as a result
the y-remover module also operates on pairs of features.
We propose a general deep model along with SGD-based
optimizers to solve the optimization problem in Equation 7,
as explained in the next section.
4 DEEP ARCHITECTURE
By utilizing the latest breakthroughs in the area of deep neu-
ral networks, we can practically find good local optimums
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Fig. 4: The private-feature extraction framework. z and y
are the primary and sensitive variables, respectively. x1 and
x2 are two independent samples, and f1 and f2 are their
corresponding features. z-predictor just uses f1 to compute
the first term of loss function, whereas y-remover uses both
f1 and f2 to compute the second term of loss function (see
Equation 7). Solid lines show data flow and dotted lines
indicate affection.
of non-convex objective functions through SGD based algo-
rithms, and accurately estimate complex non-linear func-
tions. Today, a large portion of state of the art learning
models are deep. Therefore, having a general framework
for privacy preserving deep inference is necessary. In this
paper, we focus on image data (in the context of identity
v.s. gender, expression, or age recognition), and propose a
deep architecture based on CNN (Fig. 5) to optimize the
objective function of the relaxed problem (Equation 7). It
is worth mentioning that the proposed framework can be
generalized to other applications and deep architectures
(e.g. recurrent neural networks).
We call the proposed Deep Private-Feature Extractor archi-
tecture; DPFE. We consider two consecutive CNNs; one as
the feature extractor and the other as the primary variable
predictor. A simple strategy for building these modules is
the layer separation mechanism introduced in [44]. We can also
employ batch normalization layer [45] and normalize each
dimension of the feature space, as stated in Section 3. In
the following, we first introduce the layer separation mech-
anism, and then proceed with dimensionality reduction and
noise addition issues that can enhance the preservation of
privacy.
4.1 Layer Separation Mechanism
To deploy our framework, we can start from a pre-trained
recognizer of primary variable (e.g. a deep gender recogni-
tion model), and make it private to the sensitive variable
(e.g. identity). In order to do this, we choose the output
of an arbitrary intermediate layer of the pre-trained model
as the preliminary private-feature and simply partition the
layers of the model into two sets: the elementary and the
secondary layers that form the feature extractor and the
primary variable predictor, respectively. In this way, the
same model can be easily fine-tuned by just appending the
contrastive loss function and continuing the optimization
process, leading to the private-feature as the intermediate
layer’s output. This procedure is shown in Fig. 5.
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Fig. 5: Deep CNN architecture for private-feature extraction
(DPFE architecture). x1 and x2 are independent random
samples and y1 and y2 are their corresponding sensitive
labels. y-remover first checks the equality of sensitive labels
and then apply the information removal loss function.
One may argue that separating the layers of a deep
model is sufficient to obtain an ideal private-feature in the
intermediate layer due to the nature of deep networks. In
general, the higher layers of a deep architecture provide
a more abstract representation of the data and drop the
irrelevant information including the sensitive information
[46] and preserve the primary variable [47]. Therefore,
there is no need to fine-tune the model with the suggested
DPFE architecture. However, this argument can easily be
rejected by considering the counter example provided by
deep visualization techniques. For example, [48] provided
a method to reconstruct the input image from intermediate
layers of a deep network. Osia et.al. used this method in
[44] and demonstrated that the original face image can be
reconstructed from some intermediate layers of the gender
recognition model. Thus, there is no guarantee that the
intermediate layers drop the sensitive information (identity
in this case).
4.2 Dimensionality Reduction
Imagine that the extracted private-feature has a low dimen-
sion (in Section 5 we use a 10-dimensional feature space). In
this case, we will benefit from the following advantages:
• We can highly decrease the communication cost be-
tween user and the service provider, because instead
of sending the raw input data to the cloud, the user
will only send the private-feature of the input.
• As shown in Section 5, we need to estimate an expec-
tation to measure the privacy, thus lower dimension
will help us to avoid the curse of dimensionality
during the approximation process.
• Reducing the dimension of the private-feature will
intrinsically improve privacy as suggested by [44]
and [49].
7Nevertheless, a potential disadvantage of the dimensional-
ity reduction is that it can negatively affect on the accuracy
of the primary variable prediction. However, we show in
our experiments that the adverse effect of dimensionality
reduction is negligible.
Reducing the dimensionality can be done as a pre-
processing step on the pre-trained network. In fact, after
choosing the intermediate layer, we can first execute the
following operations: (i) Embed an auto-encoder with a low
dimensional hidden layer on top of the chosen layer; (ii)
Fine-tune the model to obtain the new primary variable
predictor, and (iii) Choose the auto-encoder’s hidden layer
as the new intermediate layer which is low dimensional.
Consequently, we can fine-tune the model with DPFE archi-
tecture to get a low dimensional private-feature.
4.3 Noise Addition
As mentioned earlier, many of the privacy preservation
methods, from randomization technique to differentially
private algorithms, rely on noise addition to gain privacy
as it increases the uncertainty. We can utilize this technique
after finishing the training procedure, in the test phase,
when the dimensionality reduction is employed and the
granularity of the sensitive variable is finer than the primary
variable (e.g. identity is finer than gender).
Adding noise to the private-feature will smooth out
the conditional distributions of both primary and sensitive
variables and form a tradeoff between privacy (of sensitive
variable) and accuracy (of primary variable). This tradeoff
can be helpful in real world applications, because one can
choose the desired point on privacy-accuracy curve, based
on the the importance of privacy or accuracy in a specific
application. We will discuss this tradeoff in detail in Sec-
tion 6.
5 PRIVACY MEASURE
In this section, we propose a method for evaluating the
quality of privacy algorithms. Considering the problem
formulation by mutual information (Equation 1), one may
suggest the negative of mutual information between the ex-
tracted private-feature and the sensitive variable (−I(f; y)),
as a privacy measure. Since I(f; y) = H(y) − H(y|f) and
H(y) is constant, this approach is equivalent to considering
H(y|f) as the privacy measure. However, this measure has
two shortcomings: (i) it is difficult to obtain an efficient
estimation of p(y|f); and (ii) there is no intuitive interpreta-
tion of this measure for privacy. In order to resolve these
problems, we can relax the definition of uncertainty. We
achieve this by partitioning the conditional probabilities by
their rank order and build a lower bound for the conditional
entropy:
H(y|f) =
∫
p(f)
cy∑
ya=1
p(ya|f) log 1
p(ya|f)df
It is known that among some numbers which sums into
one, the r’th highest value is lower than or equal to 1r .
So if we consider rf,a as the rank of p(ya|f) in the set of{
p(yj |f)|j ∈ {1, . . . , cy}
}
sorted descending, we have:
H(y|f) ≥
∫
p(f)
cy∑
ya=1
p(ya|f) log rf,adf
= Ep(f,y) log r , Lrank
(8)
which leads to the following definition by dividing all
formulas by log cy , in order to have a normalized measure
between zero and one.
Definition 10 (Log-Rank Privacy). The log-rank privacy of a
discrete sensitive variable y, given the observed feature
vector f, is defined as:
LRP (y|f) = 1
log cy
Ep(f,y) log r (9)
where r is a random function of f, and y corresponds to
the rank of p(y|f) in the set of {p(yj |f)|j ∈ {1, . . . , cy}}
which has been sorted in a descending order.
Assuming we have an estimation of p(y|f), log-rank
privacy can be empirically estimated by the sample mean
of training in the rank logarithm:
ˆLRP (y|f) = 1
N log cy
N∑
i=1
log
(
rank
(
p(yi|fi), Si
))
Si =
{
p(yj |fi)|j ∈ {1, . . . , cy}
}
where rank(a, S) for a ∈ S is the rank of a in the
descending ordered set S. In the following, we provide
some intuition about the log-rank privacy and its relation
to entropy, k-anonymity and classification error.
20-questions game interpretation. Consider the 20-
questions game, in which we want to guess an unknown
object by asking yes/no questions from an oracle. As stated
in [50], the entropy is equivalent to the minimum number
of questions one could ask in order to find the correct
answer. Now consider the situation where we cannot ask
any kind of yes/no questions, but only the questions in
which we guess to be a candidate for the final answer, e.g.
’is the answer a chair?’. Also assume that if we can guess
the correct answer after k questions, we would be penalized
by log k; so that the wrong guesses are punished more at
the beginning. Evidently, the optimal strategy to have the
minimum expected penalty is to guess the objects in the
same order with their probabilities. Using this strategy, the
expected penalty would be equal to the log-rank privacy.
k-anonymity and expected rank. k-anonymity deals
with the number of entities we are equally uncertain about.
Expected rank can be considered as a soft interpretation
of this number, relaxing the equal uncertainty with the
weighted sum of ranks. Thus, the rank variable expectation
can be thought as the expected number of entities that we
are in doubt about.
Classification error extension. One could suggest using
classification error (zero-one loss) as the privacy measure,
as it represents the deficiency of the classifier. Using this
measure is equal to considering zero and one penalty for the
correct and wrong guesses of the first question, respectively.
Thus, two situations where we can find the correct label
8Procedure 1 DPFE Training Phase
Input: training data, intermediate layer, attribute set
M0 ← attribute prediction model
L← intermediate layer of M0 (e.g. conv7)
|L| ← size of L’s output
A← attribute set (e.g. {Gender & Age})
AE ← linear auto-encoder with input/output size of |L|
H ← hidden layer of AE (private-feature layer)
Initialize AE with PCA weights on L’s output
M1 ← embed AE to M0 on top of L
SL,A ← fine-tune M1 on A
z ← A , y ← Identity
PL,A ← fine-tune SL,A with DPFE architecture
Output: SL,A: simple model, PL,A: DPFE fine-tuned model,
H : private-feature layer
in the second and tenth question are considered equal
and both penalized by one. The log-rank privacy handles
this issue by penalizing different questions using their
ranks’ logarithm and can be considered as an extension of
classification error.
Sensitivity analysis. Empirically approximating an ex-
pected value by drawing samples from a probability distri-
bution is a common method in machine learning [37]. For
comparing empirical estimation of log-rank privacy with
entropy, we need to estimate the order of probabilities in the
former, while the exact values of probabilities are needed in
the later. In general, approximating the log-rank privacy is
less sensitive to the error of the density estimation and can
gain lower variance. Detailed sensitivity analysis is out of
scope of this paper and will be considered in future work.
6 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the proposed private-feature
extractor by considering the problem of facial attribute pre-
diction. We use each face image as an input and infer its
facial attributes such as gender, expression, or age, in a
supervised manner. We extract a feature for facial attribute
prediction, which at the same time is non-informative with
respect to the identity of the person (sensitive attribute). In
all of our experiments, we used the CelebA face dataset,
presented in [51], which includes 40 binary facial attributes,
such as gender (male/female), age (young/old), and smil-
ing (yes/no) with the corresponding identity labels. In the
following, first we explain the experiment setting and then
we discuss the results.
6.1 Experiment Setting
In our evaluations, we used the layer separation mecha-
nism followed by dimensionality reduction and noise ad-
dition. We selected the state of the art pre-trained facial
attribute prediction model presented in [52] and called it the
original model.3 Then, we chose an attribute set (e.g. {gender
& age}) to preserve its information as the private-feature.
3. We used a similar implementation from https://github.com/
camel007/caffe-moon which used the tiny darknet architecture from
https://pjreddie.com/darknet/tiny-darknet/.
Next, we selected an intermediate layer (e.g. layer conv7)
of the chosen network. Since this layer can also be a high
dimensional tensor, we embeded a linear auto-encoder and
applied batch normalization on its hidden layer to obtain the
normalized intermediate features. Finally, by fine-tuning the
network, we may have an attribute prediction model with
low dimensional intermediate feature, which we refer to as
the Simple model in the rest of the paper. While the low-
dimensional feature preserves the information of attributes
(see Theorem 2), it does not necessarily omit the sensitive
information. Hence, we should fine-tune the network with
the proposed DPFE architecture (figure 5) to remove identity
information from the intermediate features. We refer to
this model as the DPFE model. These steps are depicted in
Procedure 1. We implemented all the models with the Caffe
framework [53], utilizing the Adam optimizer [54], and a
contrastive loss function.
We evaluated each fine-tuned model based on the fol-
lowing criteria:
• Accuracy of the facial attribute prediction: achieving
higher accuracy implies that the primary variable
information is well preserved.
• Identity privacy: we evaluate the privacy of the fea-
ture extractor, using two different measures. First, the
log-rank privacy measure, introduced in Section 5.
Second, we utilize 1NN identity classifier and con-
sider its misclassification rate which must be high in
order to preserve privacy (although this condition is
not sufficient as discussed in Section 5. We also use
the deep visualization technique presented in [48]
to demonstrate that the higher layers of the deep
network may not be reliable.
To show the generality of the proposed method, we
consider four different intermediate layers (conv4-2, conv5-
1, conv6-1 and conv7) together with five attribute sets (listed
below), and the results for twenty Simple and twenty DPFE
models.
• G: {gender}
• GA: {gender, age}
• GAS: {gender, age, smiling}
• GASL: {gender, age, smiling, big lips}
• GASLN: {gender, age, smiling, big lips, big nose}
In what follows, we first explain the accuracy-privacy
tradeoff based on the log-rank privacy measure and 1NN
misclassification rate (Subsection 6.2). We then present the
visualization result (Subsection 6.3), and finally address
the complexity issue of the private-feature extractor by
implementing the proposed framework on a smartphone
(Subsection 6.4).
6.2 Accuracy vs. Privacy
To evaluate Simple and DPFE models, we designed the
following four experiments and assessed different models
based on their accuracy-privacy trade-off:
1) We compared Simple and DPFE models to show the
superiority of DPFE fine-tuning;
2) We assessed the effect of different intermediate lay-
ers to indicate the appropriateness of higher layers;
9Procedure 2 DPFE Test Phase
Input: test data, intermediate and private-feature layers,
attribute set, model
H ← private-feature layer
A← attribute set
M ← model
C ← covariance matrix of H in M
for r ∈ {ratios} do
Nr ← Gaussian noise layer with covariance rC
Mr ← embed Nr as an additive noise on H in M
Hr ← output of H +Nr
pr ← identity privacy of Hr
ar ← average accuracy of Mr on A
end for
plot accuracy-privacy curve using
{
(ar, pr)|r ∈ {ratios}
}
Output: accuracy-privacy trade-off
3) We evaluated the effect of extending attribute
set and showed that preserving privacy becomes
harder;
4) We considered mean and standard deviation of
Rank-privacy measure to guarantee privacy.
In order to adjust the accuracy-privacy trade-off, we
used the noise addition mechanism. After the training
phase, we estimate the covariance matrix of the feature
space, scale it with different ratios and use it as a covariance
matrix of a Gaussian noise. By increasing the amount of
noise, the accuracy of the primary variable prediction de-
creases but the privacy of the sensitive variable increases. As
a result, we can build the accuracy-privacy trade-off curves
in a manner similar to the trade-off in rate-distortion theory
(see [50]). The evaluation steps are shown in Procedure 2.
The accuracy-privacy curves of different models can be
compared based on the following definition.
Definition 11 (Acc-Priv superiority). For two models that try
to preserve privacy of a sensitive variable and maintain
accuracy of a primary variable, the one which always
results in higher value of privacy for a fixed value of
accuracy, is Acc-Priv superior.
Considering Equation 7, it seems that the relative impor-
tance of accuracy and privacy can be controlled by changing
the values of parameter β. However, this is not feasible
in practice due to the challenges in the training stage. For
example, training with a constant β and consequent noise
addition mechanism, it is possible to set different accuracy-
privacy strategies by utilizing a single trained model. This is
not the case when we have various models by considering
different values for β. We used cross validation, in order to
choose a suitable fixed value for β in our experiments.
We computed the accuracy-privacy trade-off on the
test data with 608 identities. Setting noise to zero, for all
intermediate layers and attribute sets, Simple and DPFE
models reached the same accuracy level as the original
model with an error margin of less than 0.5%.4 Therefore,
we can conclude that all Simple and DPFE models preserve
the facial attribute information, and we may concentrate on
4. In order to report the accuracy of an attribute set, we consider the
average accuracy of predicting each binary attributes in the set.
their privacy performance.
Effect of DPFE fine-tuning. In order to verify the
superiority of DPFE fine-tuning over Simple fine-tuning, we
compared the accuracy-privacy curve of different models,
fine-tuned with DPFE or Simple architectures. Figure 6
shows the results for the combination of two layers and two
attribute sets, with different privacy measures. In all cases,
DPFE models have the Acc-Priv superiority over Simple
models. In other words, for a fixed value of accuracy, DPFE
consistently achieves higher levels of privacy.
Effect of higher layers. Comparison of the accuracy-
privacy curves of different layers on the same attribute set
is depicted in Figure 7. The results illustrate the Acc-Priv
superiority of higher layers for two attribute sets and for
both privacy measures. This observation is inline with our
earlier assumptions about the higher layers.
Effect of attribute set extension. The accuracy-privacy
trade-off of the DPFE fine-tuned models for different
attribute sets with conv7 as the intermediate layer, are
shown in figure 8. The results show that as we enlarge
the attribute set and restrict the model with preserving
the information, then preserving privacy becomes more
challenging due to the intrinsic correlation of the identity
with facial attributes.
Guaranteeing privacy. As discussed in Section 5, in-
stead of log-rank, we could also consider the rank itself by
analyzing its mean and variance. This idea is depicted in
figure 9 for Simple and DPFE models. The results show
that the DPFE model has Acc-Priv superiority over the
Simple model. More importantly, it forces the conditional
distribution of the sensitive variable to converge to an
uniform distribution, at least in the rank-mean and standard
deviation sense. In fact, the mean and the standard deviation
of rank measure for the discrete uniform distribution are 0.5
and 0.28, respectively. As shown in figure 9, when privacy
increased, the statistics for the DPFE model converge to
their corresponding values for the uniform distribution. If
we consider the normal distribution for the rank variable,
we can provide an (, δ) privacy guarantee, similar to the
method used in differential privacy [25]. For example, as
depicted in figure 9, we can achieve the gender accuracy of
up to 90% with a rank-mean of 0.3 and standard deviation
of 0.25. Hence, with a probability of 0.88% we can claim that
the rank-privacy is greater than 0.1, and we have achieved
10% anonymity.
6.3 Visualization
Visualization is a method for understanding the behavior
of deep networks. It provides an insightful intuition about
the flow of information through different layers. We used
an auto-encoder objective visualization technique [48] to
validate the sensitive information removal in DPFE. The
reconstruction of images is done by feeding the private-
feature to the Alexnet decoder proposed in [48]. Therefore,
we may visually verify the identity removal property of the
private-feature by comparing the original and reconstructed
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Fig. 6: DPFE vs. Simple models: fine-tuned models with DPFE architecture achieve Acc-Priv superiority to corresponding
Simple models in all layers and attribute sets.
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when putting more preservation constraints on the model.
The intermediate layer is set to conv7.
images. These images are shown in figure 10 for different
layers of the original and DPFE fine-tuned models.
The results can be analyzed in two aspects: accuracy
of desired attributes and privacy of identities. From the
privacy perspective, the identity of the people in the re-
constructed images of the original model can be readily
observed in the last layers (e.g. conv7), while that is not
the case for DPFE models. Therefore, just relying on the
output of higher layers in the original model can not as-
sure acceptable privacy preservation performance, while the
DPFE models assure the privacy of identities. Regarding the
accuracy, we can observe and detect the facial attributes in
both models.
6.4 Complexity vs. Efficiency
Although higher intermediate layers may achieve better
accuracy-privacy trade-off, in some cases, such as low-
power IoT devices or smartphones, their computational
complexity may not be acceptable. Therefore, due to the
limited resources on these devices (both memory and com-
putational power) a privacy-complexity trade-off should
TABLE 1: Device Specification
Google (Huawei) Nexus 6P
Memory 3 GB LPDDR4 RAM
Storage 32 GB
CPU Octa-core Snapdragon 810 v2.1
GPU Adreno 430
OS Android 7.1.2
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variable for DPFE and Simple models for layer conv7.
also be considered. In order to address this problem, we
evaluated the original architecture without dimensionality
reduction on a smartphone and measured its complexity
in different layers. The results are shown in figure 11. By
gradually reducing the complexity of the private-feature
extractor (considering lower intermediate layers in the layer
separation mechanism), we also managed to reduce the
inference time, memory and CPU usage, while hiding the
user’s sensitive information.
We evaluated the proposed implementation on a modern
handset device, as shown in Table 1. We evaluated the
intermediate layers cumulatively, and compared them with
the on-premise solution (full model). We used Caffe Mo-
bile v1.0 [53] for Android to load each model and measured
the inference time (figure 11a) and model memory usage
(figure 11b) of each of the 17 configurations. We configured
the model to only use one core of the device’s CPU, as
the aim of this experiment was a comparison between the
different configurations on a specific device.
Results show a large increase in both inference time and
memory use when loading the on-premise solution due
to the increased size of the model, proving the efficiency
of our solution. More specifically, and by considering the
layer conv4 2 as a baseline, we experienced a 14.44% in-
ference time and 8.28% memory usage increase in conv5 1,
43.96% inference time and 22.10% memory usage increase in
conv6 1, 90.81% inference time and 35.05% memory usage
increase in conv7, and 121.76% inference time and 54.91%
memory usage increase in all layers (on premise). CPU
usage also increases per configuration, however due to the
multitasking nature of an android device, it is challenging to
isolate the CPU usage of a single process and naturally the
results fluctuates. Moreover, use of the lower intermediate
layers can significantly reduce the complexity of private-
feature extractors, especially when dealing with implement-
ing complex deep architectures e.g. VGG-16 on edge devices
and smartphones [55].
Analyzing the complexity of different layers can lead us
to considering accuracy-privacy-complexity trade-offs. As
an example, consider Figure 7 and suppose we want to
preserve the gender information. Comparing conv7 with
conv4-2 and setting the accuracy to 95%, we obtain 10%
more log-rank privacy with the cost of about 90% more
inference time. In this way we can choose the right strategy
based on the importance of accuracy, privacy and com-
plexity. Also by using the dimensionality reduction we can
highly decrease the communication cost (compare the size
of an image to size of 10 floating point numbers), although
in this case we should consider the effect of dimensionality
reduction on the complexity which is negligible.
We conclude that our algorithm can be implemented
on a modern smartphone. By choosing a proper privacy-
complexity trade-off and using different intermediate layers,
we were able to significantly reduce the cost when running
the model on a mobile device, while at the same time
preserving important user information from being uploaded
to the cloud.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a hybrid framework for user data
privacy preservation. This framework consists of a feature
extractor and an analyzer module. The feature extractor
provides a user with a private-feature which does not
contains the user’s desired sensitive information, but still
maintains the required information to the service provider,
so it can be used by the analyzer module in the cloud. In
order to design the feature extractor, we used an information
theoretic approach to formulate an optimization problem
and proposed a novel deep architecture (DPFE) to solve
it. To measure the privacy of the extracted private-feature
and verify the feature extractor, we proposed a new pri-
vacy measure called log-rank privacy. Finally, we considered
the problem of facial attribute prediction from face image,
and attempted to extract a feature which contains facial
attributes information while it does not contain identity
information. By using DPFE fine-tuning and implementing
the model on mobile phone, we showed that we can achieve
a reasonable tradeoff between facial attribute prediction
accuracy, identity privacy and computational efficiency.
Our work can be extended in a number of ways. We used
the proposed framework in an image processing applica-
tion, while it can be used in other learning applications e.g.
speech or text analysis and can be extended to other deep
architectures e.g. recurrent neural networks. We formulated
the problem for discrete sensitive variables but it can be
extended for general cases. Analyzing the log-rank privacy
measure can also have many potential applications in the
privacy domain. An interesting future direction could be
involving the log-rank privacy in the design of learning to
rank algorithms. In an ongoing work, we are considering
the challenge of privacy in a Machine Learning-as-a-Service
platform.
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APPENDIX A
PRELIMINARIES
Quantizing some intuitive concepts like uncertainty and
information, is one of the main information theory advan-
tages. In this part we briefly discuss these phenomenons
and refer the readers to further detailed discussion in [50]
and [56].
The entropy of a discrete random variable x is defined as:
H(x) = Ex[− log p(x)]
which can be used to measure the uncertainty we have
about x. Differential entropy is the extention of this def-
inition for the continuous random variables: h(x) =
− ∫ f(x) log f(x)dx, where here f(x) is the probability den-
sity function of x. We can also define entropy for joint and
conditional probability distributions:
H(x, y) = Ex,y[− log p(x, y)]
H(x|y) = EyEx|y[− log p(x|y)]
Based on these definitions, we can define the mutual
information between two random variables, which tries to
measure the amount of uncertainty reduction about one of
them, given the other one:
I(x; y) = H(x)−H(x|y) = H(y)−H(y|x)
It is also equal to kl-divergence between p(x, y) and
p(x)p(y). kl-divergence between two probability distribu-
tions p and q is a non-negative distance measure between
them, define as:
Dkl[p‖q] = Ep[log p
q
]
So we have I(x; y) = Dkl[p(x, y)‖p(x)p(y)]. These are the
information theoretic definitions we used to define and
solve the privacy preservation problem. Further information
can be accessed through [50].
APPENDIX B
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
From positivity of kl-divergence we know that:
kl(p(z|f)‖q(z|f)) =
∫
p(z|f) log p(z|f)
q(z|f) dz ≥ 0
So we have: ∫
p(f, z) log
p(z|f) p(z)
p(z) q(z|f) dz df ≥ 0
Also we know that:
I(f; z) =
∫
p(f, z) log
p(f, z)
p(f)p(z)
df dz
=
∫
p(z)
∫
p(f |z) log p(z|f)
p(z)
df dz
Thus:
I(f; z) ≥
∫
p(f, z) log
q(z|f)
p(z)
dz df
B.2 Proof of Theorem 4
From Lemma 3 we know that:
I(f; y) =
∑
a
p(ya)
∫
p(f |ya) log p(f |ya)∑
b p(yb)p(f |yb)
df
= −
∑
a
p(ya)
[
H(f|ya) +
∫
p(f |ya) logEyp(f |y)df
]
So by using Jensen inequality we have:
I(f; y) ≤−
∑
a
p(ya)
[
H(f|ya) +
∫
p(f |ya)Ey log p(f |y)df
]
= U1
We can manipulate U1 as:
U1 =
∑
a
p(ya)
∫
p(f |ya)
[
log p(f |ya)
−
∑
b
p(yb) log p(f |yb)df
]
So we get:
U1 =
∑
a
∑
b
p(ya) p(yb) Dkl
[
p(f |ya)‖p(f |yb)
]
=
∑
a
∑
b:b6=a
p(ya) p(yb) Dkl
[
p(f |ya)‖p(f |yb)
]
B.3 Proof of Theorem 7
By using Lemma 5 and 6 we get:
U1 '
∑
a
∑
b: b6=a
Nya
N
Nyb
N
Dkl
[
p(f |ya)‖p(f |yb)
]
≤
∑
a
∑
b: b6=a
Nya
N
Nyb
N
∑
(i,j):
yi=ya
yj=yb
1
Nya
1
Nyb
1
2σ
‖fi − fj‖22
=
1
σN2
∑
(i,j): yi 6=yj
‖fi − fj‖22 = U2
(10)
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B.4 Proof of Theorem 8
In order to prove this theorem, first we need to address the
following lemma:
Lemma 12. Assuming f1 and f2 are two samples from p(f)
with mean µ and covariance matrix Σ we have:
E
[
‖f1 − f2‖22
]
= E
[
(f1 − f2)T (f1 − f2)
]
= 2diag(Σ + µµT )− 2µTµ = 2diagΣ
So by normalizing the feature space to has variance one
for each dimension, E
[
‖f1 − f2‖22
]
is fixed and equal to
2d where d is the dimension.
Now we can state the proof of Theorem 8. Considering
{fi}Ni=1 as i.i.d. samples from p(f) and setting dij = ‖fi −
fj‖22 we have: ∑
i,j
dij '
(
N
2
)
2d
We can also split pairs with their y labels similarity:∑
i,j:yi=yj
dij +
∑
i,j:yi 6=yj
dij '
(
N
2
)
2d
and get:
1
N2
∑
i,j:yi 6=yj
dij '2d(N − 1)
N
− 1
N2
∑
i,j:yi=yj
dij
=
1
N2
∑
i,j:yi=yj
(2dN(N − 1)
k
− dij
)
where k is the number of similar pairs in the training data.
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